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Abstract
We study cartel stability in an industry that is subject to uniform yardstick regula-
tion. In a theoretical model, we show that the number of symmetric firms does not
affect collusion. In a laboratory experiment, however, we do find an effect. If any-
thing, increasing the number of firms facilitates collusion. Our theory suggests that
an increase in heterogeneity increases the regulated price if firms do not collude, but
also makes collusion harder, rendering the net effect ambiguous. Our experiment
suggests that the effect of collusion is stronger.
JEL Classification Codes : C73, C92, L13, L41.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that in unregulated markets, an increase in the number of firms hinders
collusion. The higher the number of firms, the higher the potential benefits of deviating
from a cartel agreement (see e.g. Motta, 2004). The same holds for firm heterogeneity.
The more firms differ, for example in terms of size, the harder it becomes to form a
cartel. Smaller firms have stronger incentives to deviate from collusive agreements (see
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e.g. Ivaldi et al., 2003). Experimental studies, such as Abbink and Brandts (2005) or
Fonseca and Normann (2008), confirm these insights.
Yet, much less is known about the incentives to collude in an industry that is subject
to yardstick competition. With yardstick competition, prices for regional monopolies are
set by a regulator on the basis of actual costs of similar firms. This gives such firms an
incentive to try to agree to keep their costs high, or at least to report that costs are high
(Tanger˚as, 2002). Many industries are subject to yardstick regulation. Most notably, in
the US Medicare’s payment to a hospital for a treatment depends on the average cost
of similar treatments in other hospitals (Shleifer, 1985). But yardstick competition is
also used in industries as diverse as water supply and sewerage1, electricity networks2,
railways3 and bus transport services4, to name but a few.
More often than not, industries with yardstick competition are subject to consol-
idation. Regulators and antitrust authorities then face an extra challenge: to decide
whether to allow such consolidation. To be able to do so, it is essential to have a thor-
ough understanding of how industry structure affects the incentives to collude. Insights
from unregulated markets do not necessarily carry over to these environments. This
paper aims to contribute to that understanding.
One example of the issues involved is the Dutch energy-distribution industry. In that
industry, the number of network operators has halved during the past decade. At the
same time, firm-size heterogeneity has increased. The industry now consists of a few
large players, and some small ones (see Haffner et al., 2010) These changes influence the
effectiveness of yardstick competition if they affect the incentives for firms to collude.
Understanding the relationship between industry structure and collusion is thus essential
for understanding the effectiveness of regulation through yardstick competition.
In this paper, we study to what extent the number of firms and firm-size heterogeneity
in an industry subject to uniform yardstick competition affects collusion. We first do
1Dassler, Parker and Saal (2006).
2Haffner, Delmer and Van Til (2010); Bla´zques-Go´mez and Grifell-Tatje (2009); Jamasb and Pollitt
(2007).
3Mizutani, Kozumi and Matsushima (2009).
4Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (2002).
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so in a theoretical framework. A theoretical model is an important tool in helping
to understand the fundamental mechanisms that are at play, and the tradeoffs that
are involved. However, repeated game models of the type we study do suffer from a
multiplicity of equilibria, and remain silent on how, and to what extent players in the
real world may be able to coordinate on one of those equilibria. Therefore, we also test
our model in a laboratory experiment.
Ever since Shleifer (1985) it is well known that yardstick competition is most effective
with a discriminatory yardstick. The price that one firm can charge then depends on
the cost levels of all other firms. Still, in our analysis, we focus on a uniform yardstick,
where the price that one firm can charge depends on the weighted average cost levels
of all firms involved. Despite the superior theoretical properties of a discriminatory
yardstick, a uniform yardstick is more often used in practice.5
We use a simple model, loosely based on Shleifer (1985), where firms have to exert
costly effort to lower their costs. For simplicity, managerial benefits are a concave and
quadratic function of a firm’s marginal costs. Managers aim to maximize the sum of
profits and managerial benefits, and do so in a repeated game. In our theoretical analysis
we find that, with symmetric firms, the number of firms has no effect on cartel stability.
However, firm-size heterogeneity hinders collusion. The effect of mergers on cartel sta-
bility is ambiguous. Mergers that lead to symmetric market shares facilitate collusion.
Mergers that do not involve the smallest firm in the industry, hinder collusion as they
improve the competitive outcome for the smallest firm, making it more attractive for
the manager of that firm to defect from a cartel agreement. If two small firms merge,
then such a merger usually facilitates collusion.
Our experimental implementation is loosely based on Potters et al. (2004). To fa-
cilitate coordination, we allow subjects to communicate in each period, before setting
their cost level. We look at five treatments that differ in the number of firms (2 or 3)
and the extent of firm-size heterogeneity. In each treatment, we study how successful
experimental subjects are in establishing collusion. To do so, we look at three measures
5One example being the Dutch energy-distribution industry discussed above (Haffner et al., 2010)
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of collusion: the incidence of full collusion, a collusion index, and the resulting market
price.
Most surprisingly, we find that in our experiment an increase in the number of
symmetric firms facilitates collusion. We do find that firm-size heterogeneity hinders
collusion, but only in the case of 3 firms. Two firms with different sizes in fact find
it easier to cooperate than our theory predicts - but still harder than 2 symmetric
firms. Also, we find evidence that mergers that lead to symmetric firms indeed facilitate
collusion. The theoretical effects of an increase in heterogeneity are ambiguous. On
the one hand, such an increase raises prices if firms do not collude; on the other hand,
it makes collusion harder. Our experiment suggests that the net effect for consumers
is positive. Summing up, we find that a heterogeneous industry structure is of key
importance for having relatively little collusion under yardstick competition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides more back-
ground on yardstick competition, while Section 2.2 discuss other experiments studying
the impact of industry structure on the incidence of collusion. Section 3 describes our
theoretical model. Section 4 presents the experimental design, while Section 5 describes
the results of our experiment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Yardstick competition
The last decades saw the liberalization of several network industries that used to be
state-owned vertically-integrated monopolies. Examples include telecommunications,
electricity, gas, water and sewerage. Parts of these industries are natural monopolies
characterized by subadditivity of costs, which calls for regulatory supervision (Viscusi et
al., 2005). A key component of such supervision is the regulation of tariffs. Historically,
regulated tariffs were either based on actual costs or an allowed rate of return. However,
such schemes give little incentive to increase productive efficiency, as lower costs directly
translate to lower revenues. Hence, the incentive power is low, as a change in costs
hardly affect firms’ profits. Introducing price-cap regulation solves this problem, but
4
also implies the risk of significant rents or losses for regulated firms. To overcome both
problems, Shleifer (1985) proposed to use tariffs based on the actual costs of a group of
similar (benchmark) firms. This type of tariff regulation is called yardstick regulation.
As tariffs are based on the relative performance of a firm, yardstick regulation is generally
seen as a powerful tool both for giving incentives for productive efficiency as well as for
rent extraction (Tanger˚as, 2002; Burns, Jenkins, and Riechmann, 2005).
The incentive power of a yardstick partly depends on the exact manner in which costs
of the benchmark firms determine tariffs. Essentially, there are two types of yardsticks.
With a uniform yardstick every firm faces the same cap on the tariffs it may charge,
based on cost information of all firms in the benchmark group. With a discriminatory
yardstick, every firm faces a specific cap based on the costs of all other firms in the
benchmark group. The latter scheme gives a stronger incentive to improve efficiency.
For both schemes, numerous methods exist to determine the yardstick, including the
(weighted) average costs, the median costs, the 25th percentile of costs or just the best
practice of all benchmark firms (Yatchew, 2001). In the Dutch regulation of electricity
distribution networks, for instance, the yardstick is based on weighted average costs.
Experiences with yardstick regulation exist in several industries, including the water
supply and sewerage industry in the United Kingdom (Dassler, Parker and Saal, 2006),
electricity networks in the Netherlands (Haffner, Delmer and Van Til, 2010), Spain
(Bla´zques-Go´mez and Grifell-Tatje, 2009) and the United Kingdom (Jamasb and Pollitt,
2007), railways in Japan (Mizutani, Kozumi and Matsushima, 2009) and bus transport
services in Norway (Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 2002). In several cases, the introduction of
yardstick regulation improved productive efficiency or resulted in lower consumer prices.6
In other cases, however, the experience appeared to be less successful.7
6Mizutani et al. (2009), for instance, find that the efficiency of Japanese railway companies, mea-
sured by the variable costs per unit of output, improved significantly after the introduction of yardstick
regulation. Jamasb et al. (2004) report that the British model of incentive regulation in the electricity
distribution industry has brought significant price reductions to consumers. Haffner et al. (2010) find
that yardstick regulation of the Dutch electricity and gas networks resulted in lower network tariffs
without adversely affecting network investments.
7Dalen et al. (2002) for instance do not find an effect on the cost efficiency of Norwegian bus com-
panies, for which the authors blame the bargaining power of the regulated firms to reduce the incentive
power of the regulatory scheme. For the incentive regulation in the Spanish electricity-distribution
5
What these experiences teach us are that a number of conditions have to be met
before yardstick regulation can be effective. First, there should be a sufficiently large
number of comparable firms using similar techniques operating within a similar environ-
ment. That is, a large group of homogeneous benchmark firms should exist. Second,
revenues of regulated firms should be fully based on the yardstick. They should not take
other concerns into account, such as the impact yardstick regulation may have on the
risk of bankruptcy. Finally, firms should operate independently from each other. Any
cooperation would reduce the effectiveness of yardstick competition (Jamasb, Nillesen
and Pollitt, 2004).
In this paper we therefore assess the risk of collusion with yardstick regulation under
different industry structures. Tanger˚as (2002) observes that yardstick competition is
near useless if firms are able to collude. In his model, collusion takes place through joint
manipulation of productivity reports that the regulator uses to determine tariffs. In our
paper, firms that collude jointly refrain from exerting effort to lower actual costs. In
Tanger˚as (2002), collusion becomes less likely if the number of firms increases, which is
in line with the literature on collusion in unregulated markets.
In unregulated markets, the feasibility of collusion also depends on the heterogeneity
of firms. The more firms differ, the harder it is to reach an agreement (see e.g. Motta,
2004). In empirical work this is found for the US airline industry, where the extent of
competition appears to be positively related to firm-size heterogeneity (Barla, 2000). In
our paper, we study whether the same holds for industries with yardstick regulation.
2.2 Experiments on collusion
Several economic experiments have analysed the impact of industry structure on collusion
in unregulated markets. Most studies focus on the effect of the number of firms. Huck
et al. (2004) study homogeneous-product quantity-setting oligopolies. They find some
collusion in markets with 2 firms, little collusion in markets with 3 firms, and no collusion
industry, negative effects on consumer welfare were found by Bla´zques-Go´mez et al. (2011), which re-
sulted from the fact that inefficient firms received financial compensations afterwards in order to prevent
bankruptcies.
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in markets with 4 or 5 firms. Other studies look at homogeneous-product price-setting
oligopolies. Abbink and Brandts (2005) find that collusion decreases with the number
of firms when costs are private information. Abbink and Brandts (2008) find the same
result with increasing marginal costs, and Fonseca and Normann (2008) with capacity
constraints. Fonseca and Normann (2012) also find more collusion with fewer firms.
Moreover, they find that the ability to communicate facilitates collusion, the effect being
strongest for industries with an intermediate number of firms.
Other experiments focus on asymmetries between firms. With quantity setting, Ma-
son et al. (1992) find more collusion if firms have equal rather than different marginal
costs. Phillips et al. (2011) confirm this result. With price competition, Fonseca and
Normann (2008) find more collusion if firms have identical capacity constraints, and
Dugar and Mitra (2009) find more collusion if the range of possible firm-specific marginal
costs is smaller. Dugar and Mitra (2013) confirm the latter result in a slightly different
context. Argenton and Mu¨ller (2012) however, find that collusion is unaffected if firms
have different rather than identical cost structures. Still, overwhelmingly, experiments
on unregulated markets find that asymmetries do hinder collusion.
To the best of our knowledge, the only economic experiment that also deals with
yardstick regulation is Potters et al. (2004), on which our experiment is loosely based.
Potters et al. (2004) study the effect of yardstick design on collusion in a duopoly with
symmetric firms. They compare a uniform yardstick to a discriminatory one. When
firms behave non-cooperatively, the discriminatory yardstick yields lower prices and
lower profits, making it more prone to collusion. In their experiment, the authors indeed
find higher cost levels with a discriminatory yardstick. Of course, our research question
is very different from that addressed in Potters et al. (2004). Another difference is that
the experiment in that paper also includes a stage in which firms set prices, while we




There are n firms that play an infinitely repeated game. Each firm acts as a local
monopolist. For simplicity, we assume that firm i faces demand that is completely
inelastic, with mass αi ∈ (0, 1). We normalize total demand, so
∑n
i=1 αi = 1 and αi
reflects firm i’s share of total demand. For ease of exposition, we will refer to αi as the
market share of firm i. In each period, i decides on its constant marginal cost ci for
that period. Firm i’s profits then equal pii(ci, c−i) = (pi − ci)αi, where pi is determined
through regulation. The vector c−i consists of the cost levels chosen by other firms, that
affects pii through the regulated price pi.
We assume that the manager of firm i maximizes
ui(ci) = pii(ci, c−i) +Ri(ci), (1)
with Ri a managerial benefit that is non-negative and concave: Ri ≥ 0, R
′′
i < 0, and
Ri(0) = 0. Note that this specification is equivalent to Shleifer (1985), where managers









where a, b ∈ R+ are parameters and ci ∈ [0, b/a]. Throughout, we assume that a
and b are such that all expressions we derive are well defined. The assumption that
managerial benefit is proportional to market share is for consistency: if the market
is shared among more firms, we do not want total managerial benefit to exogenously
increase as a result. Note that we allow Ri to be decreasing in ci for large enough ci.
In electricity networks for example, high marginal costs are often associated with a lack
of maintenance. Such networks are prone to outages, compensation claims and political
pressure, all factors that do not exactly contribute to a quiet life for the manager.8 Also,
8Moreover, note that in our set-up demand is inelastic. In the more realistic set-up of elastic demand
it can be shown that a concave and strictly increasing managerial benefit implies a total utility function
that is indeed strictly decreasing for high enough ci.
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this choice simplifies the experimental implementation of our model. Note that for all





The regulator uses a uniform weighted yardstick, where the price a firm is allowed





which implies that all firms get to charge the same price. For simplicity, we assume that
all firms choose to charge this price, rather than any lower price. This is also what we







αi + (bci − ac2i )αi. (5)
3.2 Firm-size heterogeneity
We are interested in how the extent of firm-size heterogeneity affects collusion. For
that, we need a measure of firm-size heterogeneity of our industry. Naturally, the most
homogenous industry structure is one in which all firms have the same size. With two
firms, an industry arguably becomes more heterogenous if the (weakly) larger firm gains
market share relative to the (weakly) smaller firm. For example, industry structure
B with (αB1 , α
B
2 ) = (0.7, 0.3) is more heterogeneous than industry structure A with
(αA1 , α
A
2 ) = (0.6, 0.4) . If we extend this definition to more than two firms, we have the
following
Definition 1. Suppose we move from industry structure A to industry structure B.
Then B is more heterogenous than A if that move consists of a transfer of market share
from some firm i to some firm k, with i the weakly smaller firm in industry structure A.
Hence, B is more heterogeneous than A if ∃i, k with αAi ≤ α
A











j for all j 6= i, k.
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From this definition, we immediately have
Lemma 1. An increase in heterogeneity implies an increase in the Herfindahl index.
Proof. Consider a move from industry structure A to industry structure B, where B is
more heterogeneous. Without loss of generality, αBi = α
A




k + ∆ for
some ∆ > 0 and αAi ≤ α
A




j for all j 6= i, k. The Herfindahl index in























With αAk ≥ α
A
i and ∆ > 0, this implies that HB > HA.
3.3 Competition
Consider the case where managers unilaterally maximize their utility. For ease of expo-
sition, we will refer to this as the competitive outcome. For given c−i, maximizing (5)
with respect to ci yields
c∗i =
b− 1 + αi
2a
. (8)
Note that this is a dominant strategy, as it does not depend on the cost level of
other firms. Also note that c∗i is increasing in market share αi : the higher αi, the
stronger the influence this firm has on the regulated price, and the more attractive it is
to choose a higher cost level. Finally, note that c∗i is strictly lower than the cost level
that maximizes managerial benefits (given by (3)). Lower costs increase profits, giving
managers an incentive to be more efficient.
Note that, if consumers value the product at v, total welfare equals
















where the first term is consumer surplus, and the other two terms reflect total managerial
utility. Maximizing with respect to ci yields that at the social optimum all firms charge






From (8), the social optimum is reached if all firms are vanishingly small, so αi = 0 ∀i.
In terms of comparative statics, we can now establish
Theorem 1. In the competitive outcome, we have the following:
(a) An increase in firm-size heterogeneity implies an increase in the regulated price.
(b) With symmetric firms, an increase in the number of firms implies a decrease in
the regulated price.
Proof. From Lemma 1, an increase in firm-size heterogeneity implies an increase in the


















with H the Herfindahl index. This establishes (a). As an increase in the number of
symmetric firms lowers H, it also implies (b).
3.4 Collusion
As usual, a cartel is stable if the short-run benefits of defection are outweighed by the
long-term losses due to cartel breakdown. In other words, following e.g. Friedman (1971)
we assume grim trigger strategies and look for the critical discount factor δˆ such that all
managers have an incentive to stick to the cartel agreement. With the usual arguments







with uDi the utility of manager i when she defects, u
K
i her utility in a cartel, and u
∗
i her
utility in the competitive outcome. This implies that we require








For cartel stability, we need that this condition is satisfied for all managers:
δ > δˆ ≡ max
{




We will focus on the cartel agreement in which all managers set the same cost level
ck, that maximizes the sum of their utilities. Arguably, this is the most obvious and
focal agreement. We will refer to it as the perfect symmetric collusive agreement. Of
course, if this would not yield a stable cartel, managers could still try to coordinate
on a different agreement, either symmetric or asymmetric. In our theoretical analysis,
however, we rule out this option as we feel that it would be much harder to coordinate
on such an alternative. Of course, in the experimental implementation of our model,
firms are free to try to coordinate on whatever they can agree upon.
If firms coordinate on a common cost level ck, we immediately have p = ck, so all










Theorem 2. The perfect symmetric collusive agreement yields a stable cartel if, for all
i = 1, . . . , n,











j the Herfindahl index.
Proof. For the cartel to be stable, we need that (13) is satisfied for all i. To evaluate the
values for u∗i , u
K
i , and u
D
















with c∗−i ≡ (c
∗




i+1, . . . , c
∗










with c∗−k ≡ (c
∗
k, . . . , c
∗
k). Third, as it is a dominant strategy for a manager to set c
∗
i given









b2 + 1 + α2i − 2αi
)
. (19)
Plugging (17)–(19) into (13) gives the result.
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From the proof of the theorem, we have that for manager i, her utility in a cartel is














α2i > 2H − 1. (21)
If this condition is not satisfied, manager i earns more in the competitive outcome than
in the perfect symmetric collusive agreement; her managerial benefits are lower, but the
increase in profits more than makes up for this. Hence (21) is a necessary condition for
cartel stability.
To analyze how exogenous factors affect cartel stability, we need to know how these
affect the manager with the highest critical discount factor. We can establish:
Lemma 2. If the perfect symmetric collusive agreement is stable, then the critical dis-
count factor δˆi(αi) is the highest for the smallest firm.











(1− αi) (1 + αi − 2H)(






For the cartel to be stable we need from (21) that α2i > 2H−1 for all i, which implies that
the numerator is positive. With the denominator clearly positive as well, this implies
∂δˆi(αi|H)
∂αi
< 0, which establishes the result.
Lemma 2 immediately implies that a cartel is stable if and only if the smallest firm
has no incentive to defect.
3.5 Factors that facilitate collusion
We now study which factors facilitate collusion. First, and somewhat surprising, we find
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Theorem 3. With symmetric firms, an increase in the number of firms has no effect
on the stability of collusion.
Proof. With symmetric firms, αi = 1/n for all firms so from Theorem 2 the critical


























)2 = 12 , (23)
which does not depend on n.
This result can be understood as follows. Different from the situation in an un-
regulated market, defection utility in a cartel with uniform yardstick competition is
decreasing in the number of firms. Here, the utility a manager obtains when defecting
from a cartel agreement is mainly driven by her market share, which is exogenously
given. That market share is decreasing in the number of firms. Competition profits
and cartel profits also decrease in the number of firms. From (13), the net effect on
cartel stability is ambiguous. In our simple quadratic framework, the lower utility from
defecting and the lower utility from staying in the cartel exactly cancel out, yielding no
effect on cartel stability.
For the effect of firm-size heterogeneity, we find the following:
Theorem 4. An increase in firm-size heterogeneity increases the critical discount factor
and hence makes a cartel less likely to be stable.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Comparing this result to Theorem 1, we thus have an interesting trade-off. On the
one hand, a more homogeneous industry structure implies a lower price – provided that
firms behave competitively. At the same time, however, it makes collusion more likely.
We now study the effect of a merger in our framework. First, it is straightforward
to establish the following
14
Theorem 5. Suppose we are in industry structure A. A merger leads to industry struc-













1− αA + (αA)2 −HA
, (24)
with ακ the market share of the smallest firm in industry structure κ, and Hκ the Herfind-
ahl index in industry structure κ, κ ∈ {A,B}.
Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2.
Using this theorem, we can derive a number of scenarios in which a merger either
always facilitates, or always hinders collusion:
Corollary 1. A merger affects cartel stability in the following manner:
(a) If the merger does not affect the market share of the smallest firm, then it hinders
collusion.
(b) Suppose that after the merger, there is no firm with a smaller market share than
the merged firm. Then a sufficient condition for the merger to facilitate collusion
is that the pre-merger industry structure has H ≤ 7/16.
(c) If the merger leads to symmetric firms, then it facilitates collusion.
Proof. In Appendix A.
Result (a) is particularly strong: whenever the smallest firm (or one of the smallest
firms) is not part of the merger, then the merger necessarily hinders collusion. The
intuition is as follows. As the market share of the smallest firm is unaffected, the merger
also has no effect on either the collusion utility or the defection utility of the manager
of that firm. However, it does affect her utility in the competitive outcome. From the
proof of Theorem 1 a more concentrated industry implies higher competitive prices, and
hence higher competitive utilities. Thus, defection from a cartel becomes less costly in
the long run, making it more attractive to defect.
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Broadly speaking, the results suggest that most mergers that lead to a more homoge-
neous market structure (such as the scenarios described in (b) and (c) of the Corollary)
facilitate collusion, while most mergers that lead to a less homogeneous market structure
(such as the scenario described in scenario (a)) hinder collusion. In our experiment, it
is not feasible to study many of the scenarios described in the Corollary in depth. We
will therefore focus on part (c).
4 Experiment
4.1 Design
In our experiment, subjects play the game described above for at least 20 rounds. From
round 20 onwards, the experiment ends with a probability of 20% in each round, to
avoid possible end game effects (see also Normann and Wallace, 2012). We use fixed
matching: every subject plays with the same group members in all rounds.
Every round consists of three steps. First, subjects can communicate using a chat
screen. This chat is completely anonymous. Second, subjects unilaterally choose cost
levels ci. Third, prices are determined using (4). After each round, subjects learn the
profits and managerial benefits they have realized, and the cost levels that each subject
has set. Although not very common in a cartel experiment, we feel that the unrestricted
communication we allow for creates circumstances that are closest to the real world.
Also, without communication, it is hard to sustain collusion in a cartel experiment with
more than two players, see e.g. Haan et al. (2009).
We set a = 1/24 and b = 1. These choices assure that the competitive and collusive
cost levels derived in (8) and (15) are integers. We run 5 treatments that differ in
the number of firms and the extent of firm-size heterogeneity. In our exposition, we
normalize the total size of the market to 12 rather than 1, which allows us to represent
market sizes of all firms in all treatments as integer numbers.9 The first 3 treatments
have 3 firms and are denoted TrioXYZ, with X, Y and Z the size of firms 1, 2 and 3,
9Note that in the actual experiment, we always normalized the size of the smallest firm to 1, which
makes it easier to explain the experiment to the subjects. See the instruction in Appendix B for an
example.
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respectively. The other treatments have 2 firms and are denoted DuoXY, with X and Y
the sizes of firms 1 and 2.
Table 1: Overview of treatments.
Treatment Market shares Competition Cartel







∗ c∗k = pk δˆ
Trio444 33% 33% 33% 0.333 4 4 4 4.00 12 0.50
Trio633 50% 25% 25% 0.375 6 3 3 4.50 12 0.64
Trio642 50% 33% 17% 0.389 6 4 2 4.67 12 0.71
Duo66 50% 50% 0.500 6 6 6.00 12 0.50
Duo84 67% 33% 0.556 8 4 6.67 12 1.00
Market shares give the markest shares that we impose for each experimental firm in that treatment,
HHI is the resulting Hirschman Herfindahl Index. ci is the competive cost level of firm i that our theory
predicts, p∗ the resulting regulated price, ck and pk are the collusive cost levels and prices predicted by
our theory, δˆ the critical discount factor for the cartel to be stable.
Table 1 provides information for each treatment. The first panel gives the market
share for each firm and the resulting Herfindahl index. The second panel provides
competitive cost levels and the resulting price. The third panel gives collusive cost levels
and the critical discount factor δˆ of the cartel. From (15), collusive cost levels do not
depend on industry structure; in all treatments, the perfect symmetric collusive cost
level equals 12.
The 5 treatments allow us to evaluate the effect of the number of firms and firm-size
heterogeneity on market performance in terms of cost levels and regulated prices. They
also allow us to evaluate the effect of a merger. In our evaluation of the experimental
results we do not interpret the critical discount factors as a strict prediction of the
outcome of the experiment. Thus, we do not expect that there will always be collusion
whenever the δ we impose is larger than the δˆ we derived. Neither do we expect that
there will never be collusion whenever the δ we impose is smaller than the δˆ we derived.
Rather, we interpret a higher value of δˆ as making a cartel less likely to occur, or more
successful if it occurs. This is in line with other work (see e.g. Bigoni et al, 2012).
From Theorem 3 we expect that, with symmetric firms, the number of firms does
not affect collusion:
17
Hypothesis 1 (Number of firms). The amount of collusion in Duo66 is the same as
that in Trio444.
From Theorem 4 we expect that more heterogeneity implies less collusion:
Hypothesis 2 (Heterogeneity). (a) There is more collusion in Duo66 than in Duo84;
(b) There is more collusion in Trio444 than in Trio633, and more collusion in Trio633
than in Trio642.
Finally, from Corollary 1(c) we expect that mergers that lead to symmetric firms,
facilitate collusion:
Hypothesis 3 (Merger to symmetry). (a) There is more collusion in Duo66 than in
Trio633; (b) There is more collusion in Duo66 than in Trio642.
4.2 Implementation
The experiment was conducted at the Groningen Experimental Economics Laboratory
(GrEELab) at the University of Groningen in February and March 2013. A total of
214 subjects participated, all students from the University of Groningen (80.4%) or the
Hanze University of Applied Sciences (19.6%), most of them in the fields of economics
and business (59.3%). Every session consisted of one treatment and lasted between
80 and 115 minutes. Subjects signed in for sessions, while treatments were randomly
assigned to sessions.
Every treatment with 2 subjects was played in two sessions while every treatment
with 3 subjects was played in three sessions. Between 14 and 18 subjects participated
in a session, resulting in 16 to 17 groups per treatment. This is similar to other car-
tel experiments, see e.g. Bigoni et al. (2012), Dijkstra et al. (2011) and Hinloopen
and Soetevent (2008). The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Printed instructions were provided and read aloud.10 On their computer, subjects first
had to answer a number of questions correctly to ensure understanding of the experi-
ment. Participants were paid their cumulative earnings in euros. Since firm size differed
10Instructions for Trio633 are reproduced in Appendix B. Instructions for other treatments are similar
and available upon request.
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between treatments, exchange rates were varied such that participants would receive
identical amounts with full collusion. Furthermore, they received an initial endowment
of e4. Average earnings were e16.80 and ranged from e7.75 to e24.00.
5 Results
5.1 Three measures of collusion
For comparison, we only include the first 20 rounds of each group in our analysis. In this
section, we introduce three measures to evaluate the extent of collusion: the incidence
of full collusion; a collusion index; and price. We explain these measures in more detail
below. For each measure, we give its development over time in each treatment, and com-
pare averages between all treatments. In the next section, we confront our hypotheses
with the results of the experiment.
We use non-parametric tests to determine whether there are significant differences
between treatments. We use the Mann-Whitney U Test (MWU) to compare two pop-
ulations, and the Jonckheere-Terpstra Test to test for ordered effects in multiple pop-
ulations.11 All significance levels reported are for the no-treatment effect versus the
one-sided alternative.
First, we look at the incidence of full collusion. In all treatments, the perfect
symmetric collusive agreement is for all firms to set a cost level of 12. For ease of
exposition we refer to this as full collusion. The incidence of full collusion is thus defined
as the percentage of markets with full collusion. Figure 1 shows how the incidence of
full collusion develops over time, in all treatments.12 The number of markets with full
collusion is substantial. There are no clear time trends. From the Figure, Trio444 seems
to be the most collusive, while the least collusion is found in Trio642.
Table 2 gives the average incidence of full collusion for all treatments, and reports on
pairwise comparisons between treatments. The entries in the right-hand panel indicate
whether the row treatment has an incidence of collusion that is significantly higher (>)
11The Jonckheere-Terpstra test compares multiple populations under the null that these are from the
same distribution, and an ordered alternative hypothesis. See Jonckheere (1954) or Terpstra (1952).
12The development of costs over time for each individual market are given in the Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Incidence of full collusion (across all groups).
Table 2: Incidence of full collusion (across all rounds and groups).
Treatment Average Trio633 Trio642 Duo66 Duo84
Trio444 71.8% ≈ >∗∗ >+ >∗
Trio633 58.1% >+ ≈ ≈
Trio642 34.4% <∗ ≈
Duo66 56.3% ≈
Duo84 43.4%
Entries in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields rates of full collusion that are
significantly lower (<), significantly higher (>), or that do not differ significantly (≈) from the rates in
the column treatment. Differences between treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality. +:
significant at 10% level; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%.
or significantly lower (<) than the column treatment, or whether the difference is not
significant (≈). We use this convention throughout the remainder of this paper. From
the Table, we thus have for example that Trio444 leads to significantly more collusion
than Trio642, Duo66, and Duo84. The difference with Trio633 is not significant.
One drawback of this measure is that it only considers markets to be collusive if
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market participants succeed in achieving full collusion. Arguably, any market with
prices higher than those in the competitive outcome is collusive to at least some extent.
Also, the closer prices are to the fully collusive outcome, the more collusive that market
is. We therefore study the collusion index, which is the relative premium that firms





with p∗ the competitive price. Note that this measure allows for the fact that the
competitive price level differs across industry structures (see Table 1). If the competitive
outcome is achieved, the collusion index equals 0. If the collusive outcome of 12 is
achieved, it equals 1. The higher the index, the more successful firms are in colluding.
Figure 2: Average collusion index per round (across all groups).
Figure 2 shows how the collusion index develops over time, in all treatments. Quali-
tatively, the picture looks very similar to that for the incidence of full collusion. Trio444
seems the most collusive, and Trio642 the least collusive treatment. Table 3 gives treat-
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Table 3: Collusion index (across all rounds and groups).
Treatment Average Trio633 Trio642 Duo66 Duo84
Trio444 99.6% ≈ >∗∗ >∗ >∗
Trio633 74.6% ≈ ≈ ≈
Trio642 65.9% ≈ <+
Duo66 73.1% ≈
Duo84 77.9%
Entries in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields a collusion index that is
significantly lower (<), significantly higher (>), or that does not differ significantly (≈) from the index
in the column treatment. Differences between treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality.
+: significant at 10%; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%.
ment averages and pairwise comparisons.
Figure 3: Average market price per round (across all groups).
Of course, a regulator is most interested in the price for consumers that ultimately
prevails. Despite a slightly higher incidence of collusion, for example, an industry struc-
ture may still be preferable if it leads to lower competitive prices that more than outweigh
the adverse effects of the occasional cartel. For that reason, we also look at prices. Aver-
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Table 4: Market price (across all rounds and groups).
Treatment Average Trio633 Trio642 Duo66 Duo84
Trio444 11.00 ≈ >∗ ≈ ≈
Trio633 10.04 ≈ ≈ ≈
Trio642 9.48 ≈ <∗
Duo66 10.32 ≈
Duo84 10.76
Entries in the right-hand panel indicate whether the row treatment yields prices that are significantly
lower (<), significantly higher (>), or that do not differ significantly (≈) from the column treatment.
Differences between treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality. ∗: significant at 5%.
age prices over time are given in Figure 3. Consistent with our earlier measures, average
prices are high, and come closest to the collusive outcome in Trio444. From Table 4,
most pairwise comparisons are no longer significant.
5.2 Test of hypotheses
In the previous subsection, we gave an overview of the experimental results. We now
discuss to what extent those results confirm our hypotheses.
Table 5: Comparison of treatments with symmetric firms (across all rounds and groups).
Measure Trio444 Duo66
Incidence of full collusion 71.8% >+ 56.3%
Collusion index 85.8% >∗ 73.1%
Price 11.0 ≈ 10.3
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly higher (>), or does not
differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right. Differences between treatments are tested using the
MWU test for equality. + denotes significance at the 10% level; ∗ at 5%.
Hypothesis 1 is concerned with the number of (symmetric) firms. From Table 5,
however, this hypothesis is clearly rejected by our data. Both the incidence of full
collusion and the collusion index are significantly higher in Trio444 than in Duo66.
Average prices are also much higher, but this difference is not significant. These results
are surprising: if anything, one would expect it to be harder to coordinate on a collusive
outcome with 3 rather than 2 players. However, the opposite seems to be true here.
To understand why that may be the case, we analyzed the chat sessions of the subjects
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Table 6: Characteristics Trio444 and Duo66.
Trio444 Duo66
Total periods 340 320
# periods with agreement different from 12 5 25
Period first suggested to all set 12:
Average 3.71 7.06
Median 1 2.5
Instances of tacit collusion 0 0
“Period first suggested to all set 12” is the first period in which any subject in a market raised the
possibility that all players should set their cost level equal to 12. When no subject ever raised that
possibility, that observation is set equal to 21. Tacit collusion is defined in this context as all subjects
setting cost level 12 without ever having discussed that possibility.
in these two treatments. For this purpose, we had all chats coded independently by two
coders. Table 6 gives some summary statistics. The first thing to note is that in markets
with 3 firms, there were only 5 instances in which subjects explicitly agreed on setting
cost levels different from 12. In markets with 2 firms, there were 25 such instances.13
Hence, players in 2-player markets more readily agreed on alternative arrangements.
Moreover, groups that did figure out that it is a good idea to set cost level 12 took much
more time to do so in 2-firm markets than in 3-firm markets. These differences cannot
be explained by tacit agreements: in either treatment, there wasn’t a single instance
in which all subjects set costs equal to 12 without someone raising that possibility.
Summing up, having 3 players apparently makes it easier to agree on the focal equilibrium
and less tempting to try other scenarios.
Table 7: Comparison of treatments with 2 firms (averages across all rounds and groups).
Measure Duo66 Duo84
Incidence of full collusion 56.3% ≈ 43.4%
Collusion index 73.1% ≈ 77.9%
Price 10.3 ≈ 10.8
Entries between values indicate that the value to the left does not differ significantly (≈) from the value
to the right. Differences between treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality.
13In the 3-firm case, these alternative agreements all consisted of setting different cost levels and
rotating roles. In the 2-firm case, there were 11 such rotating agreements, 2 agreements to set a symmetric
cost level different from 12, 11 asymmetric agreements, and 1 partial agreement (that only involved 1
player)
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Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the effect of heterogeneity. For the case of 2 firms,
Table 7 shows that the incidence of full collusion is higher in Duo66, but the average
value of the collusion index is lower. Average prices are also lower. However, none of
these differences is significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2(a) is not confirmed.
Table 8: Comparison of treatments with 3 firms (averages across all rounds and groups).
Measure Trio444 Trio633 Trio642 Trio444 JT
Incidence of full collusion 71.8% ≈ 58.1% >+ 34.4% <∗∗ 71.8% ∗∗
Collusion index 85.8% ≈ 74.6% ≈ 65.9% <∗∗ 85.8% ∗∗
Price 11.0 ≈ 10.1 ≈ 9.5 <∗ 11.0 ∗
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<), significantly
higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right. Differences between two
treatments are tested using the MWU test for equality; differences between all treatments are tested
using the Jonckheere-Terpstra test (JT) for equality. +: significant at 10%; ∗ at 5%; ∗∗ at 1%.
Table 8 looks at the results for three firms. Note that Trio444 is listed twice in
this table, to facilitate all pairwise comparisons. All results reported in Table 8 are
consistent with Hypothesis 2(b); for any measure, the extent of collusion is always higher
if the industry structure is more homogenous. Many of the pairwise comparisons are
not significant, but results are highly significant in a Jonckheere-Terpstra test with the
ordered alternative hypothesis that Trio444 yields more collusion than Trio633 which
in turn yields more collusion than Trio642. Note that we argued in Section 3 that the
effect of firm-size heterogeneity on price may be ambiguous, as our model predicts that
more heterogeneity makes collusion harder, but the competitive price is also higher. Our
experimental results indicate that the effect on collusion is stronger, as market prices do
go down with more heterogeneity.
Summing up, in treatments with 2 firms we do not find evidence for an effect of the
extent of firm-size heterogeneity on collusion. With 3 firms, however, we find strong
support for Hypothesis 2(b): more heterogeneity leads to less collusion.
Table 9 evaluates Hypothesis 3 and looks at the extent to which a merger to sym-
metric firms facilitates collusion. We find that Duo66 is indeed more collusive than
Trio642. Both the incidence of full collusion and the average price is significantly higher
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Table 9: Merger to symmetric firms (averages across all rounds and groups).
Measure Trio642 Duo66 Trio633
Incidence of full collusion 34.4% <∗ 56.3% ≈ 58.1%
Collusion index 65.9% ≈ 73.1% ≈ 74.6%
Price 9.5 <∗ 10.3 ≈ 10.0
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<), or does not differ
significantly (≈) from the value to the right. Differences between treatments are tested using the MWU
test for equality. ∗: significant at 5% level.
in Duo66. The collusion index also is, but that difference is not significant. However,
the differences between Duo66 and Trio633 are ambiguous and insignificant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the effect of market structure on collusion among economic
agents subject to uniform yardstick competition, an issue particularly relevant for the
debate on the effectiveness of tariff regulation. We did so both in a theoretical framework,
and in a laboratory experiment.
In our theoretical model, we find that firm-size heterogeneity hinders collusion. More
surprisingly, in a symmetric industry, the number of firms does not affect stability of
collusion. Different from models with unregulated markets, in our framework defection
becomes less attractive if the number of firms increases. That renders the net effect of
the number of firms on cartel stability ambiguous. In our parametrization, the lower
incentive to defect and the lower incentive to stick to the agreement, exactly cancel out.
The theoretical effects of mergers on collusion are ambiguous. Mergers that do
not involve the smallest firm in the industry, hinder collusion, as they improve the
competitive outcome for the smallest firm, making it more attractive for the manager
of that firm to defect from a cartel agreement. Mergers that lead to symmetric market
shares facilitate collusion.
Of course, no theoretical model can always predict what will happen in the real
world. That is particularly true for models of collusion, as these assume that cartel
agreements are always reached instantaneously and coordination is not an issue. In
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the real world, coordination problems may be an important obstacle to establishing a
cartel. Therefore, we also conducted an experiment in which we allow for unrestricted
communication between agents.
In our experiment we find that in triopolies, size heterogeneity indeed hinders col-
lusion. We do not find evidence for this in duopolies. Also, we find some evidence
that mergers that lead to symmetric market shares indeed facilitate collusion. Most
surprisingly, industries with 3 symmetric firms are more collusive than industries with
2 such firms. Apparently, with 3 firms, the focal equilibrium becomes more salient,
and subjects are less tempted to try to explore alternative agreements. We indeed find
that 2-firm markets more often reach alternative agreements, and take more time before
they start discussing the collusive outcome. The discrepancy between our theoretical
and experimental results can largely be explained by the fact that, when compared to
the theoretical prediction, subjects in a symmetric duopoly (our Duo66 treatment) are
relatively unsuccessful in establishing a cartel, while subjects in an asymmetric duopoly
(our Duo84 treatment) are relatively succesful in doing so.
Our counterintuitive results on the number of firms also provide insights relevant
for regular cartel experiments. In such experiments, the theoretical prediction is that
an increase in the number of firms hinders collusion. In our experimental setup, theory
predicts that incentives to collude do not depend on the number of firms. That implies
that any effect we find is not due to a change in incentive, but rather to a ‘pure numbers
effect’. Our results suggest that it is easier for three subjects to reach an agreement than
it is for two, when keeping incentives constant. Needless to say, more research is needed
for a deeper understanding of this issue.
Summing up, we find that firm-size heterogeneity in an industry subject to yardstick
competition has a strong effect on collusion, much more so than the number of firms. Our
theory suggests that an increase in heterogeneity increases the regulated price if firms
do not collude, but also makes collusion harder, rendering the net effect ambiguous. Our
experiment however suggests that the effect of collusion is stronger.
Our conclusions are relevant for the debate on the optimal industry structure. In
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a competitive market, a more homogeneous industry implies lower tariffs for network
users. When also taking the effects on collusion into account, our results suggest that
more homogeneity may imply higher tariffs.
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A Selected proofs
Proof of Theorem 4 Consider a move from industry structure A to industry structure
B, where B is more heterogeneous. Without loss of generality, αBi = α
A
i − ∆ and
αBk = α
A








j for all j 6= i, k. Denote
the smallest market share of all other firms as α, so α = minj 6=i,k{αj}. From Lemma 2
the smallest firm determines the critical discount factor. We have three possibilities to
consider: first, αBi > α; second, α
A
i < α and third α
B
i < α < α
A
i .
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. (A.1)
From Lemma 1, we have HB > HA, which immediately implies δˆB > δˆA.
















for fixed H we have δˆB > δˆA. The fact that HB > HA only strengthens this result.
The proof for case III, where αBi < α < α
A
i follows from a combination of the above
cases; first consider a decrease from αAi to α. From the analysis for case I, this leads to
an increase in δˆ. Next consider a decrease from α to αBi . From the analysis for case II,
this again leads to an increase in δˆ.
Proof of Corollary 1 Part 1 is straightforward. From Lemma 2 the smallest firm has
the highest critical discount factor. If (one of the) smallest firm(s) is not involved in a
merger, its market share αi is not affected, so after the merger it is still the smallest firm.
However, H will increase, which from (16) implies that δˆi(αi) increases and a cartel is
less stable.
For part 2, suppose that i and k merge; that the merged firm is (among) the smallest
on the market; and before the merger i was the smallest. From (24) and Lemma 2, this
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merger facilitates collusion if
(1− αi − αk)
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where the LHS gives the critical discount factor after the merger, and the RHS gives
the critical discount factor before the merger. Denoting the Herfindahl index before the




j and cross-multiplying, this requires
(1− αi − αk)
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where the RHS is a function of αi and αk, that we will denote r(αi, αk). We will derive
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(2− 2αi − αk)
2 .
As i is the smallest firm pre-merger, we necessarily have αi ≤ 1/n, which implies that
this derivative is strictly positive, so the smallest value is reached with αk as small as






















With r′′ (ai, 0) > 0, this implies that r(αi, 0) reaches its minimum at αi = 1/4. Taken
together, this implies that a sufficient condition for a merger to facilitate collusion is
that HA < r(1/4, 0) = 7/16, which establishes the result.
Part 3 follows from part 2. First, if a merger leads to symmetric firms, then there is
no firm after the merger that is smaller than the merged firm so the first condition in
part 2 is satisfied. Second, if there are n firms before the merger, then all firms outside
the merger necessarily have market share 1/ (n− 1) . The highest possible pre-merger
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H then occurs when one firm that merges is infinitesimally small, whereas the other
already has a pre-merger market share close to 1/ (n− 1). In that case, the pre-merger
Herfindahl index is
HA = (0)









which is smaller than 7/16 for any n > 3. For n = 3, note that the outside firm necessarily
has αj = 1/2 so, if i is the smallest firm pre-merger, we have HA = α
2
i + (1/2− αi)
2 +
(1/2)2 = 2α2i − αi +
1




















You are going to participate in an experiment in economics. We will first read
the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to read them on your own. The
instructions are identical for all participants. After reading, there is the possibility
to ask questions individually. The experiment is expected to last for approximately
90 minutes. Please refrain from talking during the entire experiment.
You will play with two other players, chosen at random. Together, you and those
two other players form a group. You will never learn who the other players are. The
experiment lasts for at least 20 rounds. In each round, you will play with the same
two players. Before the experiment starts, we randomly determine whether you are
player 1, player 2 or player 3 in your group.
In this experiment you can earn points. The number of points you earn depends
on the decisions made by you and those made by the other players in your group.
Instructions
In the experiment, each player represents a company. Each player owns a number
of production units. In each round, each player has to choose one cost level for all
production units that he or she owns. Player 1 owns 2 production units. Player 2
owns 1 production unit. Player 3 owns 1 production unit. At the beginning of the
experiment, each player starts with 40 points for each production unit that he or
she owns. Player 1 will thus receive 80 points, player 2 receives 40 points and player
3 receives 40 points. In each round, the number of points you earn consists of two
components: profit andmanagerial benefit. At the end of each round, the points
that you earned in that round will be added to your account.
After the experiment the number of points in your account will be converted to
euros. Player 1 will receive e1 for every 20 points that he or she has, player 2 will
receive e1 for every 10 points, and player 3 will receive e1 for every 10 points.
Each round consists of three steps. These steps are the same in every round.
Step 1: communication
A chat box will appear on your screen. You can discuss anything you want with the
other players in your group. However, you are not allowed to identify yourself by
name, gender, appearance, nationality, or in any other way. If you do, you will not
receive any payment after the experiment. You are only allowed to communicate in
English.
You have a limited amount of time to chat. A timer in the top right corner of
the screen will inform you of the amount of time you have left. If you prefer not to
chat any more, you can leave the chat by pressing the “Leave Chat” button. Once
you have left the chat, you cannot return in that round. Once two persons have left
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the chat, the chat will end automatically.
Step 2: choice of cost level
Each player chooses one cost level for all the production units that he or she owns.
You can choose your cost level from the following possibilities:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
The cost level you choose will influence the profits in that round for you and the
other players. It will also influence your managerial benefit.
Each production unit produces one unit of output. The price you will receive per
unit of output equals the average cost level of all production units on the market.
Example. Suppose that player 1 chooses a cost level of 10, player 2 chooses a cost
level of 5 and player 3 chooses a cost level of 7. Keeping in mind that player 1 owns
2 production units, player 2 owns 1 production unit, and player 3 owns 1 production
unit, the price for each unit of output is then
2× 10 + 1× 5 + 1× 7
2 + 1 + 1
=






The profit you earn on each unit of output equals the price minus your cost level.
Thus,
your profit = your number of production units× (price− cost level) .
For each of your production units you also receive a managerial benefit. This graph
shows how your managerial benefit per production unit depends on your cost level:
The number of points you receive in a round is equal to your profit plus your man-
agerial benefit.
If you prefer, you can also calculate your profit and managerial benefit using a profit
calculator that we will provide on screen during the experiment. Alternatively, you
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can find your profit and your managerial benefit in a table that we provide. These
tables are added to these instructions. Please put these tables in front of you now.
Each table reads as follows. Rows represent the possible cost levels you can
choose. Columns represent the average cost level per production unit of the other
two players. Where a row and a column intersect, you can find your profit. Your
managerial benefit is indicated in the last column.
Example. We consider a case in which player 1 chooses a cost level of 10, player 2
chooses a cost level of 5 and player 3 chooses a cost level of 7. As player 1 owns
2 production units and players 2 and 3 each own 1 production unit, the price per
unit of output equals 2×10+1×5+1×72+1+1 = 8. Profits, managerial benefits, and number
of points for all players can be found as follows.
• Consider player 1. Its cost level is 10. The average cost level of the production
units owned by players 2 and 3 is 1×5+1×71+1 =
5+7
2 = 6. Player 1’s profit can
be found in Table 1, in the row marked 10, and the column marked 6. You
can see that player 1 receives a profit of −4.00 points. Note that player 1 can
also calculate this directly. As noted, the price per unit of output in this case
equals 8. As player 1 owns two production units, profit is 2× (8− 10) = −4.
At the end of the row marked 10, you can see that player 1 receives a managerial
benefit of 11.67 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph. With
cost level 10, managerial benefit per production unit is roughly 5.8, which
implies total managerial benefit of 2× 5.8 ≈ 11.6.
In total, player 1 thus receives −4 + 11.67 = 7.67 points.
• Consider player 2. Its cost level is 5. The average cost level of the production
units owned by players 1 and 3 is 2×10+1×72+1 =
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3 = 9. Player 2’s profit can
be found in Table 2 (the row marked 5, the column marked 9) to equal 3.00
points. Alternatively, note that price per unit in this case equals 8. As player
2 owns one production unit, profit is 8− 5 = 3.
The managerial benefit of player 2 can be found at the end of the row marked
5 to equal 3.96 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph.
In total, player 2 thus receives 3.00 + 3.96 = 6.96 points.
• Consider player 3. Its cost level is 7. The average cost level of the production
units owned by players 1 and 2 is 2×10+1×52+1 =
20+5
3 = 8.33. If it were 8,
player 3’s profit could be found in Table 3 (row marked 7, column marked 8)
to equal 0.75. If it were 9, player 3’s profit could be found in Table 3 (row
marked 7, column marked 9) to equal 1.50. As the average cost level of other
production units is 8.33, player 3’s profit is as in column 8 plus 1/3 times
the difference between both columns: 0.75 + 13 × (1.50− 0.75) = 1.00 points.
Alternatively, price per unit equals 8. As player 3 owns one production unit,
profit is 8− 7 = 1.
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The managerial benefit of player 3 can be found at the end of the row marked
7 to equal 4.96 points. This can also roughly be seen from the graph.
In total, player 3 thus receives 1.00 + 4.96 = 5.96 points.
Step 3: summary
After all players have made their decision, you will receive the following information:
the cost levels chosen by the other players, the price for each unit of output, your
profit, your managerial benefit, and the current state of your account. Throughout
the experiment, there will also be a box on your screen where you can observe the
decisions made by you and the other players in each previous round.
End of experiment
You will at least play 20 rounds. From round 20 onwards, the experiment ends with
a 20% probability at the end of each round. With a probability of 80%, a new round
starts. You receive a message on your screen if no further round will take place.
At the end of the experiment the number of points in your account will be
converted to euros. Before you can collect your payment in private, you have to
hand in the instructions.
After the experiment, please do not discuss the content of the experiment
with anyone, including people who did not participate.
Please refrain from talking throughout the experiment.
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Figure B.1: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio444.
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Figure B.2: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio633.
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Figure B.3: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Trio642.
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Figure B.4: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Duo66.
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Figure B.5: Cost levels chosen and resulting price in each round per group in Duo84.
40
References
Abbink, K., and J. Brandts (2005): “Price Competition under Cost Uncertainty: A
Laboratory Analysis,” Economic Inquiry, 43(3), 636–648.
(2008): “24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 63, 1–31.
Argenton, C., and W. Mu¨ller (2012): “Collusion in experimental Bertrand duopolies
with convex costs: The role of cost asymmetry,” International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization, 30, 508–517.
Barla, P. (2000): “Firm size inequality and market power,” International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, 18, 693–722.
Bigoni, M., S.-O. Fridolfsson, C. Le Coq, and G. Spagnolo (2012): “Fines, Leniency
and Rewards in Antitrust,” RAND Journal of Economics, 43(2), 368–390.
Bla´zques-Go´mez, L., and E. Grifell-Tatje (2009): “Evaluating the regulator: winners
and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distribution,” Energy Economics, 33,
807–815.
Burns, P., C. Jenkins, and C. Riechmann (2005): “The role of benchmarking for yard-
stick competition,” Utilities Policy, 13, 302–309.
Dalen, D. M., and A. Gomez-Lobo (2002): “Regulatory contracts and cost efficiency in
the Norwegian bus industry: do high-powered contracts really work?,” Discussion Paper 6,
Norwegian School of Management.
Dassler, T., D. Parker, and D. S. Saal (2006): “Methods and trends of performance
benchmarking in UK utility regulation,” Utilities Policy, 14, 166–174.
Dijkstra, P. T., M. A. Haan, and L. Schoonbeek (2011): “Leniency Programs and the
Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Unrestricted Communication,” Univer-
sity of Groningen, the Netherlands.
41
Dugar, S., and A. Mitra (2009): “The Size of the Cost Asymmetry and Bertrand Com-
petition: Experimental Evidence,” Unpublished manuscript.
(2013): “Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Marginal Costs,” Unpublished
manuscript.
Fischbacher, U. (2007): “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,”
Experimental Economics, 10(21), 171–178.
Fonseca, M. A., and H.-T. Normann (2008): “Mergers, Asymmetries and Collusion:
Experimental Evidence,” The Economic Journal, 118(527), 387–400.
(2012): “Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly
Experiments,” European Economic Review, 56(8), 1759–1772.
Friedman, J. W. (1971): “A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames,” Review of
Economic Studies, 38, 1–12.
Haan, M. A., L. Schoonbeek, and B. M. Winkel (2009): “Experimental results on col-
lusion,” in Experiments and Competition Policy, ed. by J. Hinloopen, and H.-T. Normann,
chap. 2, pp. 9–33. Cambridge University Press.
Haffner, R., D. Helmer, and H. van Til (2010): “Investment and regulation: the Dutch
experience,” The Electricity Journal, 23(5), 34–46.
Hinloopen, J., and A. R. Soetevent (2008): “Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness
of corporate leniency programs,” RAND Journal of Economics, 39(2), 607–616.
Huck, S., H.-T. Normann, and J. Oechssler (2004): “Two are few and four are many:
number effects in experimental oligopolies,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
53, 435–446.
Ivaldi, M., B. Jullien, P. Rey, P. Seabright, and J. Tirole (2003): “The Economics
of Tacit Collusion,” Report for DG Competition, European Commission.
42
Jamasb, T., P. Nillesen, and M. Pollitt (2004): “Strategic behaviour under regulatory
benchmarking,” Energy Economics, 26(5), 825–843.
Jamasb, T., and M. Pollitt (2007): “Incentive regulation of electricity distribution net-
works: lessons from the experience from Britain,” Energy Policy, 35, 6163–6187.
Jonckheere, A. R. (1954): “A Distribution-Free k-Sample Test Against Ordered Alterna-
tives,” Biometrika, 41(1/2), 133–145.
Kip Viscusi, W., J. E. Harrington, and J. M. Vernon (2005): Economics of Regulation
and Antitrust. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 4th edn.
Mason, C. F., O. R. Phillips, and C. Nowell (1992): “Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric
Markets: An Experimental Evaluation,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(4),
662–670.
Mizutani, F., H. Kozumi, and N. Matsushima (2009): “Does yardstick regulation really
work? Empirical evidence from Japans rail industry,” Journal of Regulatory Economics,
36, 308–323.
Motta, M. (2004): Competition Policy - Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press,
New York.
Normann, H.-T., and B. Wallace (2012): “The Impact of the Termination Rule on
Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment,” International Journal of Game Theory,
41, 707–718.
Phillips, O. R., D. J. Menkhaus, and J. N. Thurow (2011): “The Small Firm in a
Quantity Choosing Game: Some Experimental Evidence,” Review of Industrial Organiza-
tion, 38(2), 191–207.
Potters, J., B. Rockenbach, A. Sadriehc, and E. van Damme (2004): “Collusion
under yardstick competition: an experimental study,” International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 22, 1017–1038.
43
Shleifer, A. (1985): “A theory of yardstick competition,” Rand Journal of Economics,
16(3), 319–327.
Tanger˚as, T. P. (2002): “Collusion-proof yardstick competition,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 83, 231–254.
Terpstra, T. J. (1952): “The asymptotic normality and consistency of Kendall’s test
against trend, when ties are present in one ranking,” Indagationes Mathematicae, 14, 327–
333.
Yatchew, A. (2001): “Incentive regulation of distribution utilities using yardstick compe-











List of research reports 
 
 
12001-HRM&OB: Veltrop, D.B., C.L.M. Hermes, T.J.B.M. Postma and J. de Haan, A Tale 
of Two Factions: Exploring the Relationship between Factional Faultlines and Conflict 
Management in Pension Fund Boards 
 
12002-EEF: Angelini, V. and J.O. Mierau, Social and Economic Aspects of Childhood 
Health: Evidence from Western-Europe 
 
12003-Other: Valkenhoef, G.H.M. van, T. Tervonen, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, Clinical 
trials information in drug development and regulation: existing systems and standards 
 
12004-EEF: Toolsema, L.A. and M.A. Allers, Welfare financing: Grant allocation and 
efficiency 
 
12005-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, The Global Financial Crisis 
and currency crises in Latin America 
 
12006-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and E. Sterken, Participation and Performance at the London 
2012 Olympics 
 
12007-Other: Zhao, J., G.H.M. van Valkenhoef, E.O. de Brock and H. Hillege, ADDIS: an 
automated way to do network meta-analysis 
 
12008-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Individualism and the cultural roots of management 
practices 
 
12009-EEF: Dungey, M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs, J. Tian and S. van Norden, On trend-cycle 
decomposition and data revision 
 
12010-EEF: Jong-A-Pin, R., J-E. Sturm and J. de Haan, Using real-time data to test for 
political budget cycles 
 
12011-EEF: Samarina, A., Monetary targeting and financial system characteristics: An 
empirical analysis 
 
12012-EEF: Alessie, R., V. Angelini and P. van Santen, Pension wealth and household 
savings in Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE 
 
13001-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border infrastructure constraints, 
regulatory measures and economic integration of the Dutch – German gas market 
 
13002-EEF: Klein Goldewijk, G.M. and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, The relation between stature and 
long bone length in the Roman Empire 
 
13003-EEF: Mulder, M. and L. Schoonbeek, Decomposing changes in competition in the 
Dutch electricity market through the Residual Supply Index 
 
13004-EEF: Kuper, G.H. and M. Mulder, Cross-border constraints, institutional changes 











13005-EEF: Wiese, R., Do political or economic factors drive healthcare financing 
privatisations? Empirical evidence from OECD countries 
 
13006-EEF: Elhorst, J.P., P. Heijnen, A. Samarina and J.P.A.M. Jacobs, State transfers at 
different moments in time: A spatial probit approach 
 
13007-EEF: Mierau, J.O., The activity and lethality of militant groups: Ideology, capacity, 
and environment 
 
13008-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, The effect of industry structure and 
yardstick design on strategic behavior with yardstick competition: an experimental study 
 
13009-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Values of financial services professionals and the global 
financial crisis as a crisis of ethics 
 
13010-EEF: Boonman, T.M., Sovereign defaults, business cycles and economic growth in 
Latin America, 1870-2012 
 
13011-EEF: He, X., J.P.A.M Jacobs, G.H. Kuper and J.E. Ligthart, On the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the euro area 
 
13012-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Generational shifts in managerial values and the coming 
of a global business culture 
 
13013-EEF: Samarina, A. and J.E. Sturm, Factors leading to inflation targeting – The 
impact of adoption 
 
13014-EEF: Allers, M.A. and E. Merkus, Soft budget constraint but no moral hazard? The 
Dutch local government bailout puzzle 
 
13015-GEM: Hoorn, A.A.J. van, Trust and management: Explaining cross-national 
differences in work autonomy 
 
13016-EEF: Boonman, T.M., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and G.H. Kuper, Sovereign debt crises in 
Latin America: A market pressure approach 
 
13017-GEM: Oosterhaven, J., M.C. Bouwmeester and M. Nozaki, The impact of 
production and infrastructure shocks: A non-linear input-output programming approach, 
tested on an hypothetical economy 
 
13018-EEF: Cavapozzi, D., W. Han and R. Miniaci, Alternative weighting structures for 
multidimensional poverty assessment 
 
14001-OPERA: Germs, R. and N.D. van Foreest, Optimal control of production-inventory 
systems with constant and compound poisson demand 
 
14002-EEF: Bao, T. and J. Duffy, Adaptive vs. eductive learning: Theory and evidence 
 
14003-OPERA: Syntetos, A.A. and R.H. Teunter, On the calculation of safety stocks 
 
14004-EEF: Bouwmeester, M.C., J. Oosterhaven and J.M. Rueda-Cantuche, Measuring 
the EU value added embodied in EU foreign exports by consolidating 27 national supply 











14005-OPERA: Prak, D.R.J., R.H. Teunter and J. Riezebos, Periodic review and 
continuous ordering 
 
14006-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., The college gender gap reversal: Insights from a life-cycle 
perspective 
 
14007-EEF: Reijnders, L.S.M., Child care subsidies with endogenous education and 
fertility 
 
14008-EEF: Otter, P.W., J.P.A.M. Jacobs and A.H.J. den Reijer, A criterion for the number 
of factors in a data-rich environment 
 
14009-EEF: Mierau, J.O. and E. Suari Andreu, Fiscal rules and government size in the 
European Union 
 
14010-EEF: Dijkstra, P.T., M.A. Haan and M. Mulder, Industry structure and collusion 
with uniform yardstick competition: theory and experiments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
